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The management of the energy transition1
- The process of electrification of the day-to-day life has not been achieved as is the case in 
western cities. Part of the urban dwellers do not have access to the electricity or only on a 
part time basis. But, given high growth rates of the population and the policies of 
electrification expansion, the rise of the demand creates a strong need for new electricity 
resources which the renewable electricity production means can not satisfy quickly and at 
affordable prices. The lack of local know how is also at stake. The energy transition therefore 
does not mean turning to the renewable energy sources but also increasing the generation 
from classical generation sources. 
 as it currently displayed in many institutional and 
academic publications stresses both the need and the assumed potential of the move towards new 
small scale and renewable sources of energy, mandatory for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions, 
and the promotion of local initiatives by citizens or local authorities, credited with a decisive role in 
such a transition. In the field of electricity, which we specifically focus on in that paper, it could 
encompass decentralized technologies like solar energy and the valorization of local energy 
resources (biogas, hydroelectric plant). Local authorities could play an active role, be it as owner of 
local utilities or through promoting pilot experiences and monitoring and reducing the energy 
consumption patterns of their assets. Exemplar stories of this kind as well as more balanced 
appraisals of the difficulties that such moves imply are largely discussed in the growing academic 
literature on city and energy transition (Annales de la recherche urbaine, 2007, for instance). But they 
mostly deal with Western case studies and the case of lower income countries and cities is less 
analyzed. When we turn to such places, one has to take into consideration a range of specific issues, 
among which the following.  
- The role of the local authorities is often problematic. Firstly because their involvement in the 
transition process as highlighted by the above mentioned set of prescriptions is contradicted 
by their administrative status. Limitations and lack of decentralization policies do not allow 
the local authorities to take part in the regulation of the electricity supply. It can even be that 
the institutional and financial reforms of the utilities sector according to market-oriented 
                                                          
1 We do accept in this paper the broad definition of energy transition the convenors of the seminar have proposed 
: a process of potentially radical change in the resources and technologies involved in energy generation as well 
as in patterns of energy consumption (and we add : of distribution). 
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criteria lead to a reduced role for local authorities. Their involvement can also be hindered, 
de facto, by the limitation of their budgetary means or the qualification of their manpower. 
But besides these facts, others forms of involvement of local actors can be highlighted, 
though they sometimes occur through informal means. The existing literature reviewing the 
energy transition related experiments in the Middle east simply overlooks any possible 
involvement of local authorities (Energy Research Group, 2005). 
The proposed paper intends to tackle these issues through the examination of two Middle Eastern 
cases: Jordan and Lebanon. Both countries lack national energy sources and are highly dependent 
upon imported oil and gas power plants, even if some attempts at renewable electricity plants are 
discussed. Both countries also have very high rates of urban population and their economy and 
domestic life intensively and increasingly rely on electricity.  
The paper intends to concentrate on the recent transformations in the electricity sector at the 
national and the local level to examine the degree of involvement of local or city authorities and 
actors in the regulation of the electricity sector where State agencies and, in the Jordanian case, new 
coming national or multinational corporate investors remain the dominant stakeholders. The 
purpose is to acknowledge the specific factor of their situation and their combination with more 
general trends.  
The investigation is based on fieldworks carried out in Lebanon from 2005 until 2008 and in Jordan in 
2008-20092
The social and geopolitical parameters of the energy 
transition 
. It encompasses gathering available statistics, meeting with the utilities managers as well 
with State agencies and administration involved in the sector (operation and regulation), meeting 
with local authority representatives as well as compiling of existing literature. 
Before going into the issue of energy governance, this section provides a brief presentation of the 
energy and electricity consumption issue in both countries. It will highlight that they stand at a 
turning point. The high level of consumption and the reliance on imported resources led them to 
minimize their dependency and therefore to diversify the sources of electricity generation. 
The rise of the electricity consumption 
Lebanon and Jordan are two small countries with respectively about 4 and 6 millions inhabitants, 
mostly urban. They belong to the lower-middle income category regarding the GDP/Capita with 
respectively 5612 and 2461 $ per inhabitant. According to official records, between 96 and 100% of 
the population is connected to the public network of electricity. Even if these records seem to 
overlook some categories of urban dwellers who do not have access to electricity in informal 
settlements in Lebanon, the fact is that the use of electricity is widespread. In Lebanon in 2004, 95% 
of the households have a TV, 93% a fridge, 91% an iron. In 1998, electric heating for space and water 
                                                          
2 The research in Jordan is sponsored by Tanmia, a project led by IFPO, on behalf of the French National 
Funding Agency. 
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heater represented out of the total residential electricity consumption3. In Jordan, 96% of the 
households have a TV , 93% a fridge and 95% a washing machine. But the main heating sources are 
gas and diesel, and electricity account for none in this respect. The development of solar water 
heating systems is at a relatively high level but don’t increase very much. It was at 10.5% of 
households in 1996 and at 13.7% in 2006.4
The rise of the population, very strong in Jordan and more limited in Lebanon, as well as the increase 
of the GDP, associated with these new practices, is inducing a strong growth of the electricity 
demand, which amounts to about 3,5 to 10% yearly in Jordan (2001-2008) and is estimated at 2% in 
Lebanon
 These changes are relatively new when compared to 
western societies. 30 years ago, the rate of electrical lightning in Jordan was only 71,5% (78% in 
cities): the cycle of electrifying the society, with the rise of home appliances use, is at its beginning. 
The use of electricity also change in nature, as evidenced in the summer peak, associated with the 
use of air conditioned at home or at work and in public or commercial places.  
5
Energy transition under geopolitical constraints 
. Such a growth makes compulsory for both countries to increase their production by 
adding new power plants and/or to rely on higher imports. 
Since both countries have almost no or at least very limited national energy resources that can be 
exploited in the state of the economy or of technology, they are highly dependent upon imported 
fuels. And yet, these prices have jumped in recent years because of the global surge of oil prices or, 
in the case of Jordan, because of the end of the special agreements that guarantied the supply of oil 
to the country from Iraq after 2003. This has led to new energy strategies. 
In Jordan, until 2003, trade agreements with Iraq… used to guarantee the supply of cheap oil. But the 
regime change in Iraq has ended that agreement (to be developed). Since the end of that agreement, 
the Hashemite Kingdom has deeply revised its energy strategy and has switched most of its power 
plants to natural gas instead of fuel oil. (80% of generation from gas). The Kingdom has sealed an 
agreement with Egypt for the supply of natural gas until 2015 at a fixed price. But the electricity 
demand growth prospects make compulsory to increase the production. Since the Egyptian 
government is reluctant to increase the supply and to build a new gazoduc unless a new agreement 
with revised price and quantity is reached, the Jordanian government has been forced to devise a 
new strategy. It has decided to end the subsidies to the energy sector which was weighting very 
heavy on its budget and it is seeking to diversify the energy sources. It has therefore designed an 
ambitious policy aiming to develop renewable energy power plants and prospects for a nuclear plant 
are also onwards. The purpose of that Royal Energy Strategy is to reach a 5% share of electricity from 
renewable energy power plants share in 2015 and 10% in 20206
                                                          
3 Central Administration for Statistics, The National Survey on Households Living Conditions 2004 
(
. At the same time, the launching of 
the regional grids’ interconnection with Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon provides an opportunity for 
electricity exchanges. But such a mechanism has a limited potential because of the limited capacity 
www.cas.gov.lb) and ERG 2005. 
4 Living conditions of households in Jordan, 1996; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Statistical yearbook, 
2006. 
5 But in a context of electricity shortage as we will analyze in the next section. 
6 Updated Master Strategy of Energy Sector in Jordan for the period (2007-2020). Summary, December 2007. 
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of the interconnections and the fact that none of these countries has any noticeable surpluses – in 
the contrary, the local demand is hardly met everywhere.  
In Lebanon, the situation is much worse than in Jordan. The country has never fully recovered from 
the damages the electricity network had experienced during the civil war. Though massive 
investments in the electric network and in new power plants during the 1990’s, the shortages have 
never been overcome. No new power plant has been built since 1997 and the older units don’t work 
properly and need frequent revision periods. The recent Israeli war in 2006 has damaged some units 
and affected the network. The demand, currently (2008) at 2300GW, exceeds the national 
production which stands at 1600 GW. Importations from Syria and, recently, from Egypt, do not 
compensate that discrepancy and the supply is rationed. Oil products accounts for 93% of the electric 
generation, the rest being produced thanks to hydroelectricity. Two new plants built in the 1990’s 
were supposed to be powered by natural gas, intended to be imported from Syria. But due to their 
own national growing needs and to changes in their political relationships with Lebanon, Syria has 
never supplied the gas once the pipeline has been finished in 2003. The design of gas turbines was 
intended to save money because gas is cheaper than fuel oil. Large amounts of money invested in 
order to build the power plants have been wasted, while these power plants have to work on fuel oil, 
which is very expensive and less efficient than gas. The national electric utility called Electricité du 
Liban has accumulated a huge debt, amounting yearly to one billion dollars in the three last years, 
and totalizing, with the interests, about 13 billion dollars in the period 1992-2006. It is one of the 
main sources of the national public debt (44 billion dollars in 2008). The Lebanese government has 
only recently acknowledged that the gas solution was over. It has to devise a new strategy which is 
arousing a heated debate among the political class. The minister of Energy has proposed to build new 
coal power plants and, temporarily, thermal generators. They are awaiting for the results of the next 
parliamentary elections before decision is taken. Any strategy towards developing renewable energy 
power plants is deemed inadequate and not affordable by the government, though some 
experiments have been done, mostly funded by foreign aid. Evidences from the ground suggest that 
the use of solar water heaters is developing quickly, reflecting individual strategies of energy cost-
savings, far from reaching the level of Jordan. 
Jordan and Lebanon are facing common energy and electricity transition challenges (the increasing 
demand in electricity) but they deal with it very distinctly. Both are highly dependent upon expensive 
importations of oil and (for Jordan) gas. The dependency is also geopolitical. For Lebanon because 
natural gas and electricity imports are under the control of Syria. For Jordan because the American 
invasion of Iraq has changed a special partnership with Iraq with resulted in low prices of energy. The 
move towards new energy resources or fuel has to be understood in that framework of dependency.  
The new Jordanian strategy consists in securing gas supply at negotiated prices and to develop 
nuclear as well as renewable energy power plants (solar, wind farms). This is supposed to be done 
thanks to foreign investments and strategic partnerships with foreign firms and is linked to the 
privatization strategy of the electricity sector (see next section). The Lebanese are facing no lesser 
challenges than Jordan but have not until yet designed a clear national strategy for the electricity 
sector. It is nevertheless obvious that Lebanese government is not prioritizing the development of 
renewable energy sources but favors classical technical solutions like oil powered or coal powered 
thermal plants. 
5 
 
The notion of energy transition, usually understood in a normative way, as a change in the energy 
mix including more renewable, encompasses in our case studies other meanings: the geopolitical 
constraint – rather than the ecological one – is a strong rationale for changing the energy mix while 
the harsh growth of the energy demand, resulting from the spreading of new social practices (the 
new widespread electrification of the daily life) requires the use of big power plants rather than small 
disseminated units. The transition is a change in the energy mix but not necessarily towards more 
renewable resources. These points are key parameters to understand the specificity of the transition 
and how the public authorities at various levels (nation, city) as well as the people are going to 
engage and to negotiate such a change. We will now examine the two case studies in a row before 
summing up the main lessons they have bore. 
The Jordan case: privatization of the electricity sector under 
state control 
A brief history of the electric sector in Jordan: from private and local to 
State involvement 
Two main features should be highlighted about the history of the electricity sector in Jordan: the 
leading role that private initiative, at the level of the city and with the involvement of the local 
authorities, played in its beginning. But such an early trend was reversed by the rising role of the 
State. 
As in many cases all over the world, the beginning of electricity in Jordan took place in the main city 
of the country, Amman, and was the result of a private initiative of the brothers Budeir, 
entrepreneurs of Syrian origin, in 1938. Their firm was granted a license renewed every year until 
1962. Then, JEPCO as it was now called was granted a concession contract for 50 years, which will be 
open for contest in 2012. The concession area was later adjusted in order to encompass the 
successive broadened perimeters of the city and the main urban settlements around. It must be 
noted that the municipality of Amman holds 2,5% of the shares of the firm7
A similar organization of the electricity sector has worked for years in the northern region. IDECO 
(Irbid District Electricity Company) supplies electricity to Irbid, the second main Jordanian city (about 
600.000 inhabitants in 2004) and to others secondary towns of the North, according to a license 
agreement that has been granted in 1962. IDECO started as a joint municipal and private initiative 
(with investments by Irbid families) in 1957. Therefore, the company is felt as a local firm and the 
people of the city a strong sense of belonging with the utility. The area was extended in 1962 and a 
license concession for 50 years was then granted
. 
8
During the 1960’s, the government launched a strategic reflection on a strategy in order to develop 
electricity networks all over the country, but it faced numerous oppositions from the private 
companies (Kingston, 1999). After 1967 and the occupation of the West Bank, the new political 
situation led to the implementation of this development strategy as a way to strengthen the State. 
.  
                                                          
7 Interview with Mr Marwan Bushnaq, Director of JEPCO, May 2008 and October 2008. 
8 IDECO website : www.idoco.com.jo and interviews with the director and the deputy director (may and October 
2008). The history of the company has to be confirmed and refined. 
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International grants (notably by the IBRD) helped fund the required investment. The Jordan 
Electricity Authority created in 1967 enforced that policy. It reclaimed the generation units belonging 
to the private existing companies in Amman and Irbid, entered the capital of IDECO (of which it 
owned 55,4% of the shares, against 25% for the municipalities, the rest belonging to private 
investors, mostly local families) in order to extend its perimeter of operation. It began to build a 
national power transportation grid, and began the extension of the network in the others places of 
the country (Jordan Valley and the South).  
As a result of the State involvement, the level of electricity supply improved in dramatic proportion. 
In 1961, only 17% of the households had electric lightning at home and 39.2 of the urban 
households. In 1979, the figure had risen to respectively 71.5% and 78%. As figures show above, it is 
now 99.7%. The development of electricity networks is part of a larger State effort to provide public 
services. The State aimed to legitimize its regime that the 1967 defeat and its aftermath, the Black 
September9
The privatization process: an alliance of foreign investors with the State 
, harshly challenged. The Kingdom benefited therefore from foreign funding from the 
international lenders and the United States that sought to protect and stabilize a country whose 
geopolitical role was crucial for the peace in the Middle East The mounting role for the State in the 
electricity sector has marginalized the early local and private initiatives, because of the geopolitical 
context and the correlated need for the State to establish itself as a strong a reliable service provider. 
In 1990, with the second Gulf war, the brutal end of the remittances from the Gulf and the return of 
numerous expatriates to Jordan, coupled with the (temporary) decrease of the international aid put 
the national budget under pressure. Therefore the Jordanian government engaged with a 
privatization process in several sectors. In 1997, the JEA was corporatized and in 1998, three 
subsidiaries established under the name of NEPCO (National Electricity  Power Company), in charge 
of buying, selling and transmitting electricity, CEGCO (Central Electricity Generation Company) 
running the main power plants, EDDO (Electricity Distribution Company) in charge of the distribution 
outside the JEPCO and IDECO perimeters. The next step was the creation of the Electricity Regulatory 
Committee (ERC) in 2002, in charge of designing and supervising the privatization process.  
After one unsuccessful tender in 2005, Energy Arabia announced in 2007 the purchase of 51% of 
Central Electricity Generating Company (CEGCO). Energy Arabia (Enara), a company established by 
Jordan Dubai Energy, the energy investment arm of Jordan Dubai Capital, in association with 
Malakoff (a Malaysian company) and CCC, an Athens-based firm controlled by Jordanian-Palestinian 
businessmen. In February 2008, Kingdom Electricity Company bought the State’s shares in IDECO 
(55,4%) and 100% of EDCO. Kingdom Electricity Company is a subsidiary of Jordan Dubai Electricity, 
itself owned by Jordan Dubai Capital. Jordan Dubai Capital is owned by Dubai Holding, a giant 
financial firm. This reorganization resulted from tenders where the competition was very limited, if 
there was even any10
                                                          
9 In September 1970, harsh fights between the PLO and the Jordanian Army occurred, resulting in the expelling 
of the PLO and in heavy damages in the Palestinian camps. 
. We can notice the fact that Jordan Dubai Capital appears to be involved in all 
the firms of the electricity sector. On one hand, this could be understood as the entry of the Emirati 
firms in the Jordanian economy, at a time where Emirati investors, benefiting the wealth of oil and 
10 There was only one offer for the sale of IDECO and EDCO. Interview, ERC, October 2008. 
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more generally of the UAE boom, are investing all over the world. Selling Jordanian assets to Emiratis 
is doubtless a central point but it must also be seen as a strategic and stable alliance for the regime. 
The General Manager of JD Capital is Mr. Samir al Rifa’i, the grand-son of a former Jordanian Prime 
minister, the son of a former Head of the Jordanian Senate, and a close collaborator of the Diwan 
(the Royal Administration) then a Minister himself11
It seems that the Jordanian authorities managed to keep control on the privatization process. One 
has to look if the new system allows for the very needed investments in generation units that the 
Royal Energy Strategy called for (Kabarity 2005). It might be too early to analyze its results but let’s at 
least stress that several tenders have remained without offers or they were deemed unsuccessful. 
This is particularly the case for the wind farms. The solar strategy remains until now in its design 
phase. The privatization of the thermal unit of al Hussein and the BOT tender for building a new one 
also stalled. The firms interested for investing in Jordan expect very high rewards and limited risk. 
Recently, the financial crisis and the difficulty to raise money from the banks hampered the projects. 
The nuclear project is in its early phase. Agreements have been signed with 6 countries in order to 
explore the potential of Jordan Uranium mines as well as to identify a place for a nuclear plant. The 
site of Aqaba seems the most appropriate and feasibility studies are underway. Until now, the 
burden of investment in new electricity units remains on the shoulders of the Jordanian government. 
. He is, among other commitments, a member of 
the board of CEGCO. The professional and political record of Mr Al Rifa’i can be understood as a sign 
of the control the Diwan wants to keep on the electricity sector, by appointing to key positions 
people owing their careers to the King. Conversely, the careers of Mr Al Rifa’i can be read as an 
illustration the privatization process in Jordan opened to the king’s advisors.  
Moving to privatization was strongly correlated with the end of subsidies to electricity. The goal is 
that the money collected from the customers pays for the whole spending in the electricity 
generation, transmission and generation. Therefore, the Electricity regulatory committee has 
increased the prices in 2004 and 2008. In 2008, in an apparent bid to ease the social impact of these 
hikes, the lower “social” block of the tariff have risen by only 3% while the upper ones recorded more 
than 25% increase and other non residential tariff up to 51% (agriculture) and categories of 
customers enjoying until then free tariff are now to pay. Despites these cautious moves, the rise took 
place in a time of high inflation, with concomitant end of subsidies resulting in hikes. In 2008, the 
inflation rate in Jordan amounted +14%, after 4.7% in 2007 and 6.25% in 2006. Rising prices in a 
context of widespread poverty is creating a climate of social tension. For instance, the electricity 
companies have recorded unusual “theft” practices (hook-ups, cheating the meters) and higher non-
payment.  
The privatization process in the electricity sector has social differentiated effects. On the one hand, it 
favors a new class of entrepreneurs with strong links with foreign capital and backed by the regime. 
The improved efficiency of that policy has not (yet?) produced the expected benefits in terms of 
improving the power generation. On the other hand, the social effects of the liberalization are felt 
hard in a context of rising poverty and strong inflation. Despites this situation, the link between 
energy policy and poverty alleviation is not done. 
                                                          
11 According to unconfirmed information, he is married with the daughter of the main owner of JD Capital ? – to 
be confirmed. 
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Poverty alleviation, local governance and renewable energy 
Since about 10 years, the strengthening of local governance is an central issue of development 
policies in Jordan (Malkawi, 2001). Decentralization has been seen as a tool to improve the delivery 
of public services and, more recently, is emphasized as an efficient mean, and a necessary step, to 
alleviate poverty. In 2001, a law has amalgamated the municipalities of the country, whose number 
has dropped from 315 to 99, in order to rationalize the public expenditure and make it more efficient 
(Taamneh 2007). Several initiatives have been funded by foreign donors in order to strengthen the 
capacities of the municipalities, like the currently running program by the World Bankd and AFD 
called “Local Governance and Development in Jordan”. The government officially stressed the role of 
the municipalities in such a strategy12
Academics and consultants in the field of electricity stress that developing renewable energy project 
is a mean to contribute to the alleviation of poverty, most notably in rural places. But despites that 
emphasis, these reports never mention the municipalities as potential actors in the development of 
renewable energy technology they call for and their targeted actions do not involve anyhow (RE 
Group, 2005; Kabarity, 2005). 
. 
Despites such voluntary discourses, the institutional situation of the Jordanian municipalities is 
constraining and allow for few initiatives on their own (Taamneh, 2007). The law of 2001 reducing 
the number of municipalities has been interpreted as a way to more tightly exert political control 
over the municipalities (Malkawi, 2001). Though elections have taken place twice since 2001, the 
State has at some occasion proceeded to the nomination of unelected personalities as mayor, like in 
Irbid (2005-2007). In 2007, elections have taken place but local commentators stated that the State 
intervened in order to have his favorite candidate elected13
The Jordanian local authorities marginalized and under pressure 
. Despites official discourses favoring 
decentralization, and sponsoring of new initiatives by the World Bank and other lenders, their budget 
is tightly controlled by the State (the governor) and hardly suffices for their commitments, though 
their field of competency is limited. Therefore, one can understand that they are marginalized in the 
energy policy. 
The privatization process implies new relationships at the local level regarding the management of 
the electricity sector. The local authorities are marginalized but in the same time, they are under 
pressure because of the rising prices of electricity. This could be a lever towards adopting local 
energy policies. We will focus on the case of Irbid, the second biggest in Jordan, with about 600.000 
inhabitants. 
As we stated above, the electricity utility of Irbid, IDECO, was created as the result of a local initiative 
and the municipality was involved in the board. The mayors of Irbid, Ramtha and Jerash have a seat 
in the board. Since IDECO pay yearly fixed mandatory dividend to its shareholders, it means that the 
municipalities’ budgets benefited from those incomes, even if they are limited sums. Further, IDECO 
is the main job provider in Irbid and political recommendations could help in obtaining and securing 
                                                          
12 “Municipalities can do more to fight poverty”, The Jordan Times, October 31st, 2008;  
13 Irbid election results and the cheating charge, What’s up in Jordan, August, 2nd, 2007, 
http://ajloun.blogspot.com/2007/08/irbid-election-results-and-cheating.html 
9 
 
job in the company. Yet, the private management of the company did not allow easy recruitment, 
but the mayors thanks to their access, could interfere in job recruitments or in protecting IDECO 
employees. Other local political leaders (members of Parliament, governors) could also do so. 
Until 2003, the financial results of IDECO were quite bad and in certain years, losses had to be 
compensated by the State so that the company could pay the mandatory dividend to the 
shareholders. Of course, those results were not caused only by the job policy but we can put that 
local authorities used the utility, at various degrees and in various forms, as a resource for power and 
wealth redistribution. 
The privatization means the end of these practices or at least, has been the pretense invoked to end 
them. In 2003, a new general manager has been appointed with the task of improving the financial 
results. He drastically changed the management methods. On his desk, the visitor can see a small 
engraved sign that reads “wasta14
It also seems that the relationships between the municipalities and the utilities are changing in the 
day-to-day life, for instance regarding the coordination of road works and digging for electrical 
networks, that have aroused some conflicts
 is no honest acting and it’s the best way to corruption”. His action 
resulted in the resignation of more than 400 people deemed inefficient. A small number of new 
employees have been recruited on their knowledge and skills, following manpower management 
methods. The modernization of the enterprise also improved the technical operations with 
investment in new technologies, as well as incentives for billing teams and anti-theft-teams, which 
resulted in very good records. As a result, the utility has posted higher profits and the price of the 
share has decupled. 
15. The use of poles belonging to IDECO for advertising 
and the sharing of revenues they generate is also a cause of dispute16
The file of the rises in the electricity tariff also prompts the municipality to worry for its electricity 
bills. The most worrying is the street lightning, which has recorded a growth of consumption of +6.5 
% yearly (2004-2007). Street lightning seems to be a major claim by city dwellers, as a symbol of 
access to modern urban life. For instance, street lightning appears among the most popular demands 
in surveys undertaken by the funded by the World Bank
. Conversely, the municipality is 
requesting the utility pays for the lands they use for substations and even poles. Court suits have 
been filed against IDECO in order to obtain the removal of poles in private lands. We have to 
document further these petty conflicts which seem to evidence the change from a close and 
mutually trusty relationship to a more distant one. 
17. During an interview with Irbid’s mayor18
                                                          
14 String pulling. 
, 
he stressed the will of his municipality to extend street lightning. As much as the rising prices, 
expending street lightning network is responsible for the increasing electricity bills. 
15 An interview with Reem Hamdane, operations manager at EDCO, confirmed that such conflicts also exist in 
other places (October 2008). 
16 These data have been gathered during a two days visit to IDECO and to the municipality to Irbid in october 
2008. 
17 Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Regional Planning Department, Prelimineray Follow up Chart of Sub-Projects 
of All Beneficiaries Municipalities from RDLP 
18 Interview with Abderrauf Tell, November, 3rd 2008, Irbid. 
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Street lightning used to be a massively subsidized sector, with the consumption up to the index of 
1988 being free and the above consumption being billed at only 25% of the cost (World Bank, 2005). 
The rise of electricity bills has led the municipalities to call for the ministry of local administration to 
intervene. They complain they are facing huge increases of their electricity bills and they claim the 
works undertaken for the street lightning (new lines, maintaining of poles) by electricity companies 
should be done for free. During several meetings in October 2008, they asked the Ministry of Energy 
and the ERC to take an official decision. 
The context of financial pressure on the municipalities has led to pilot experiments of new 
technologies aiming to reduce the power consumption, like installing new lamps or solar equipped 
poles for street lightning. International organizations, like the French development agency, has 
launch a pilot project for electricity demand management, oriented to energy saving. But the lenders 
tend to prefer partnerships with the electricity utilities (like JEPCO in Amman) rather than the 
municipalities. These are felt less interested and all the more, less relevant before of their lack of 
knowhow and of expertise in the field. These projects remain in their early stage, with a strong 
technological component and no legal and organizational initiative in order to broaden the scope of 
the experiment is to be found. We can hardly identify any local actors stepping in such a process. 
These elements highlight that the local authorities in Jordan do not display any sign of particular 
involvement in electric governance, and in designing local energy policies. They are more 
marginalized and under pressure actors. Conversely, the State has applied a voluntary policy of 
privatizing its main assets while keeping control on the main evolutions. 
The Lebanese case: evidences of local struggles for governing 
electricity 
In contrast to Jordan, Lebanon is less advanced in the institutional process of reforming the 
electricity sector and the State utility EDL still remains the main actor. Nevertheless, the Lebanese 
case is intriguing because, in a context a national shortage, it reveals spatially differentiated patterns 
of energy governance, in the sense that several actors, including local one, which sometimes are 
informal, are negotiating the energy (electricity) policies. We draw here on several previous analysis 
of the Lebanese case (Verdeil 2008, Verdeil 2009, Verdeil Féré Scherrer 2009). 
The spatially differentiated regulation of energy distribution 
We have analyzed above the main feature of the situation of the Lebanese electricity sector, which is 
the power shortage. After the civil war, the national delivery of electricity was about 6 hours a day. In 
2006, before the Summer War, the delivery of electricity was about 22 h a day. Then, the damages 
inflicted by Israel to some power plants and to the networks, combined with the bad state of repair 
of some old generation units, caused the shortage to increase. The shortage is spatially very 
unequally distributed (Table 1). The capital city, Beirut, enjoys nowadays about 3 hours power cut a 
day and was fully supplied before the 2006 war. But the other places suffer very severe power cuts, 
and sometimes do not get more than 10 hours electricity a day. The official stance is that the 
strategic and economical infrastructures of the country have to be best served. But it is also the place 
where the most affluent people of the country are leaving. In summertime, the summer resorts 
where foreign tourists as well affluent Beirutis are migrating also enjoy the same level of delivery 
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than the capital. The power delivery timetable is clearly benefiting the wealthiest class in Lebanon. 
Such an unequal repartition was challenged by the current Minister of Water and Energy, Alain 
Tabourian, from the Free Patriotic Movement. But in September 2008, his proposal to supply all the 
country equally was rebuked by the Council of Ministers.  
In response to the shaky delivery of electricity, fraud and non-payment have developed over the war 
years and have never been eradicated during the reconstruction years. The few indicators available 
reveal regional and geographical gaps, highlighting the informal political management of fraud. Data 
on “theft” are available only at the national scale, but not at the city level. The data show that 
fraudulent practices reach their maximum in regions far from Beirut (Verdeil, 2009).  
Table 1 : Power “theft” (Percentage of non billed consumption and non paid bills on total electricity 
production). Districts according to EDL geographical organization 
Beirut Mount 
Lebanon 
North 
Biqaa 
South 
Mount 
Lebanon 
South 
South 
Lebanon 
North 
Lebanon 
North 
Biqaa 
Middle 
Biqaa 
12,1 % 40,1 % 45,6 % 49,6 % 56 % 60,7 % 67,2 % 69,1 % 
Source : EDL, August 2003, quoted in EL MUFTI, 2005. 
According to interviews with EDL engineers, some areas like Dahiyeh (the mostly Shia populated 
southern Beirut suburbs) are also subject to strong level of fraud but mostly by small customers, 
whereas in Beirut and in the northern suburbs, fraud has been evidenced for big costumers like 
industries, shops or leisure centres, as well as for personalities. These engineers tend to minimize the 
social and confessional dimension of fraud: the poor and the Shias would not necessarily be the 
biggest cheating population, contrary to widely circulated assumptions.  
The fact is corroborated by data on bill payment. Here again, the non-payment is very high in rural 
and mountainous areas, while Mount Lebanon reaches a relatively low level (but of course, these 
regions concentrate the bigger part of the customers). In the suburbs, the collection rate has fairly 
improved over the recent years (see below). 
EDL is managing only 90% of the electricity customers, the remaining part living in places where 
ancient concessions granted to local firms are still in operation (and are approaching their term). In 
these places, the rate of losses and of non-payment is also very limited compared to the national 
picture. In Zahleh, the manager of the company is proud to display his results and he recognized 
easily that it was reached with the help of the Syrian army then being stationed near the city (and 
which was known for not paying the electricity ot EDL).  
The geography of theft and non-payment seems very closely linked with the de facto local powers 
which are prevailing in the post-Taif Lebanon, and depends upon local political arrangements. Even if 
the situation has improved over the reconstruction years, the relationships of patronage are 
preventing in most remote areas that sanctions are taken against cheating persons or non-payers 
(see Verdeil 2009 for a closer examination of data). Those facts highlight that a de facto multi-actors 
12 
 
governance of energy exists. Such a point must be taken into consideration when examining the 
changes the sector is now undergoing. 
The attempts at privatizing the distribution of electricity 
The continuous poor performance of the Lebanese utilities in service delivery is a matter of public 
debate since the early 1990’s. But the issue surfaced at the top of the agenda in the late 1990’s when 
the problem of the public debt forced the successive governments to tackle it. The accumulated debt 
of EDL during 1993-2006 amounts 11,6 billions US$ (including the interests generated) (Ministry of 
Finance, 2008). In 2008, the Lebanese public debt amounts 42 billion US$. We can conclude that the 
various utilities represent about one third of it. Regarding the electricity, the main reason of the 
rising debt is the surge of the oil price, while the tariff was not adjusted, but many other flaws in the 
management also come in line: delay in substituting the old oil processed plants by new gas units, 
corruption in the subcontracting works, technical losses, fraud and non-payment, etc.  
All this led the Hariri government to set up a program for privatization in 2000. In the electricity 
sector, a law in 2002 planned the privatisation of the sector. Later steps in the reform process19
Compared to the transformations experienced in other similar countries, one can wonder why the 
discourse of privatisation as a solution for these sectors had not been advocated previously. Indeed, 
several other sectors had experienced PPP in the 1990’s, like the garbage collection and treatment, 
awarded to Sukleen, the mobile phone awarded to Cellis and Libancell in 1994, or Liban Post (1997). 
Not to mention other private sector operations in the real estate sector (Solidere, Joseph Khoury, 
etc…). One of the reasons probably is that water and electricity were felt being more sovereign and 
strategic sectors, where public investment had to be implemented first in order to reform them 
before privatizing them. Another reason is the resistance of some of the political elites to that 
privatisation process, at least until a certain stage. In the recent years, Hezbollah – in the person of 
Mohamed Fneish, then (2005-2006) Minister of Energy and Hydraulic Affairs- didn’t oppose the 
principle of the privatisation of parts of the electricity sector but still remains wary (Verdeil 2009). 
Indeed, those previous experiments have, in most cases, illustrated the tendency of the post-Taif 
Lebanese State to allot shares and markets under impenetrable conditions and according to political 
cronyism (Leenders 2004).  
 
foresaw that the utility should be unbundled in three units for the generation, the transportation and 
the distribution subsectors. Generation and distribution are to be sold to or operated by the private 
sector. These legal and industrial evolutions have been strongly praised by international financial 
bodies, like the IMF or the World Bank, who helped drafting the new laws, as well as by national aid 
institutions like the French AFD or the USAid. The financial aid given to the Lebanese government at 
the Paris II (2002) and Paris III (2007) conferences was conditioned to the implementation of such 
reforms.  
The process of privatising the power sector only stands at its very beginning. The Saniura government 
commissioned several auditing firms and consultants in order to lay down the way to the 
corporatisation of the utility, which implies a cost accounting and the census of its assets. Then, it’s 
                                                          
19 Every minister drafted his plan: Sehnaoui (2004), Fneish (2006), Tabourian (2009). We cannot examine in 
details their analogies and differences but let’s say that the option of introducing PPP remains a central item. 
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planned to unbundle it into several functional units (generation, transportation and distribution), of 
which the first and the last would be sold or whose operation would be managed by private firms. 
Before reaching this stage, it is possible for a management contract to be established in order to 
upgrade the utility’s results. Some critical reforms must be carried out, like the setting up of a new 
tariff reflecting the rise in the generation cost resulting from the oil price surge. The tariff has not 
been updated since 1994. 
In 2007, the Lebanese government has awarded two projects of power generation plants but they 
seem to be shelved. No project has been drafted for the distribution sector yet, though PPP are 
frequently said to be the solution20
This limited experience of subcontracting private firms for reading the meters and fighting the fraud 
resulted in strongly contrasted results. At one end, EDF scored very impressive results in its period of 
operation. The amount of billed electricity rose (+50%), the rate of non-payment fell down at less 
than 4%, EDF made a hike in detected fraud (more than 100.000 thefts detected and fined in 2002-
2003)
. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 2005, an interesting experience 
took place, whose results I will analyze now. The government assigned private firms the task of 
reading the meters, of distributing the bills and collecting the fees, as well as of detecting the fraud 
and fixing it. In Beirut suburbs (da’ira of Antelias and Chiyah), the French firm EDF was 
commissioned. For the other da’ira-s throughout the country, local firms were selected after a 
tender. Most of the selected ones were without experience in the field and, as I was told, in many 
cases their owners were known for their closeness to the local zu’ama-s. The experience stopped in 
July 2005 when the contract of EDF was ended without explanations, probably because of the change 
in the balance of power after the legislative elections and the arrival of a new minister. Later on, the 
contracts of the private local firms in the da’iras were also interrupted or not renewed. 
21
                                                          
20 For instance, Le Commerce du Levant, September 2008 ; or Dana Halawi , 'Diversity key to managing fuel 
price swings', The Daily Star, March 26, 2009. 
. These achievements were obtained through ‘commando methods’, according to one 
manager: it means an intensive monitoring on the field, bimonthly fraud eradication operations, etc. 
The EDF teams faced strong opposition from fraudulent electricity users, sometimes turning to local 
riots (March 2004 in Jnah). According to the manager, the operations were successfully implemented 
with the help of the Interior Security Forces (ISF) and when necessary, thanks to coordination with 
those labelled “villages chiefs” by the manager. In Dahiyeh, he also mentioned close cooperation 
with Hezbollah. EDF targeted not only ‘small fry’ but also personalities, major enterprises, in the 
southern suburbs as well as in the northern suburbs. Their methods and results were so successful 
that EDL authorities invited EDF teams for one-day commando operations in Saida, Jounieh and 
Tripoli. The EDF enrolment was dedicated to impulse new methods and a new spirit to the 
employees of EDL regarding the distribution. The contract apparently didn’t provide for a link 
between EDF’s income and its results. It is possible that EDF was seeking to be granted a broader 
contract on the Lebanese market but its presence was part of a wider strategic help and technical 
program for the rehabilitation of EDL. In 2005, the collaboration in the distribution ended, probably 
because EDF worked on the field with associated firms that were linked to Syrian interests. 
21 S. Risk, « Énergie - Une récapitulation de ce qui ne tourne pas rond depuis des années. L’électricité, 
un secteur gangrené de toutes parts », L’Orient-Le Jour, 28/12/2004. 
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In most Lebanese provinces, the private local firms in charge of reading the meter and collecting the 
fees didn’t reach the same results. No figures were available from EDL, one reason being that EDL 
experienced many difficulties in monitoring the results these private firms achieved. According to 
non official sources embedded in the operations in the North and in the Biqaa, the results have been 
very disappointing both in terms of fees collecting and of fraud detection22
The experience of subcontracted private firms in order to read the meters, to collect the fees and to 
fight the theft delivers no black or white results. It shows that the private sector isn’t in itself the 
criterion of a successful reform: it depends very much on the political regulations on the field and the 
keenness of local forces to comply with the enforcement of new practices. In the period until 2006, it 
seems that Hezbollah favoured reform even at the expense of most of its clientele in Dahiyeh. 
Conversely, in other areas (Biqaa, North Lebanon, South), local forces have been reluctant to the 
reform of the distribution sector. Therefore, we can conclude that those experiments have 
aggravated the territorial fragmentation, since the implementation of that new management 
methods results being particularly felt by the inhabitants of the Greater Beirut. In that area, the 
better fees collections and the reducing of theft has led to an increase in spending, relatively more 
difficult to bear for the poorest households.  
. Among the many reasons 
of the deceiving operation, we can name the lack of professionalism of those firms, the flaws in the 
mechanism of linking their earnings with their results, the protection that the cheating or non-paying 
customers enjoyed from their zu’ama, as well as the lack of coordination with the ISF. 
After 2006, the poorer delivery of electricity and therefore, the need to compensate with more 
expensive generators expenditures aggravated the situation. In November 2007-January 2008, an 
array of social mobilizations against the poor delivery of electricity took place in Dahiyeh and ended 
with a bloody riot where several people fell dead, probably by army shots. This was part of the 
escalation and sectarian process that culminated in May 2008 with deadly fighting in Beirut between 
Hezbollah and their opponents. But the social roots of that event, to be found in the unequal supply 
of electricity and, on a more general level, the unbalanced service by the State, should not be 
overlooked. This is highlighting the strong resonance at the local level, of the on-going moves in the 
tentative reforms of the electricity sector. The unclear and controversial management of electricity is 
a factor of political instability.  
The local governance of informal electricity supply 
The continuous and aggravating shortage of electricity led to the consolidation of the informal sector 
of generators that had developed during the civil war and had never stopped. Given the official 
monopoly of EDL in the production and distribution of electricity, these suppliers are working 
unofficially but the State can not prevent them to work since they provide an alternative for its failed 
duty. According to various sources, between 38 and 58 % of the Lebanese households use diesel-run 
generators (ACS 2004; Corail-ICEA-IPSOS, 2004). Being run by private owners, the sector offers 
differentiated services and fee and the customers usually are not in a position of strength for 
negotiating since the territorial organization tends to the establishment of de facto local monopoly. 
In the context of increasing diesel prices and of the poor performance of the public utility, polemics 
are arisen and various actors, from grassroots NGO’s to members of Parliament, have publicly called 
                                                          
22 A sounder analyze in available in Verdeil 2009. 
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for a public regulation (Gabillet, 2008). Gabillet’s work has nevertheless evidenced that the 
municipalities are more and more involved in the management of that sector.  
She has documented a range of local situations with differentiated configurations. In Borj Hammoud, 
a densely Armenian town near Beirut, she has identified a coalition of actors, from Tachnag, the 
hegemonic Armenian Party and the municipality which it controls to the gendarmerie, officially a 
State apparatus. All of them are collaborating in order to enforce a regulation on the generators 
owners, from granting the right to settle and operate in a strictly delimited area, to the setting up of 
the price which they advise the population every month thanks to the local TV network. In Jbeil, 
another organization has recently emerged. The mayor elected in 2004 had focused on regulating the 
informal electricity sector during his campaign. In Jbeil, the distribution of electricity is not EDL but an 
ancient concession dating back the French Mandate years. That firm owns the poles that the owners 
of private generators usually use for installing their parallel network. The mayor has encouraged 
Electricité de Jbeil not to tolerate the use of its poles, for esthetic reasons and to produce and sell 
itself electricity in time of power cut. In Zahleh where another private utility operate according to a 
concession, the private actors even plan to develop their own generating units soon. In 2007, the 
ministry accepted a project of thermal plant proposed by the firm but, as we said, it has been shelved 
for the moment. A few other configurations are to be found (Gabillet, forthcoming). They all reveal 
different local patterns of electricity governance in a semi-informality, since the sector of generators 
is officially prohibited. 
Beyond the details and variety of local arrangements, those examples show that electricity is subject 
to a local governance, i.e. of local negotiations involving the State utility, the local utilities when they 
exist, the owners of generators as well as the local authorities, municipality and police apparatus. In 
a sector, electricity, where the State has long tolerated the involvement of local actors, mainly de 
facto powers rather than administrative authorities, it’s not so amazing that an energy governance 
emerges. That process is producing innovative arrangements if not from a technological point of 
view, at least in terms of policy. We can think it as part of a transition process. 
Discussion 
The preliminary review of those two case studies was carried out with an insistence on 
understanding energy transition not only at the macro and national level of countries and national 
administrations and policies, but in taking into consideration the involvement of cities, ie local 
societies and, mostly (at this stage of the survey) local authorities and companies. We have tried to 
understand how the cities are affected by and are managing the energy transition. In this concluding 
section, we ant to see to what extent the Jordanian and Lebanese situations reveal specificities or 
even contradict the trends and/or the most usually agreed recommendations concerning local 
energy policies. 
Lebanon and Jordan are two lower-middle income countries, with almost no national energy 
resource (at least that they could exploit in the contemporary state of the technology). Their energy 
consumption profiles show that they are in a time of strong increase of energy and particularly of 
electricity, and they are now shifting to an electricity-based energy system. New practices and new 
uses are spreading that consume more electricity. But there is little awareness of the global climate 
change and little inclination to adopt therefore energy-saving technologies. The only incentive in this 
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respect is the price of energy that is leading more customers to use solar heater (about 14% of the 
households in Jordan, less in Lebanon). We have seen that the Jordanian municipalities suffer 
because of the burden of their electricity bills but until now, this is not going to challenge their mood 
to extend street lightning, which is seen as a sign of modernity and development. 
The growth of the demand is prompting the national authorities to discuss the best energy mix. In 
Jordan, the ecological rationale has led to the formulation of a Royal Strategy stressing the need to 
foster renewable technologies. But no real change with respect for such objectives has begun. The 
effective changes that have been implemented in energy generation is the switch from fuel-oil to 
natural gas. It was not driven by an ecological rationale but rather by financial and geopolitical 
constraints. In Lebanon as well, the discussion turns around the way to escape the expensive fuel-oil 
thermal turbines. The unreliability of natural gas prompts the authorities to draw plans on imported 
coal. In both case, geopolitics and finance are macro-factors of energy transition, rather than climate 
change oriented arguments. The energy transition is, in those examples, a real crisis of energy 
generation, urging States to design policies which are not always or even not at all climate change 
oriented because of price, technology availability. In designing those policies, States are left at risk of 
the shortage, which means that their legitimacy is challenged, which the Lebanese case illustrates 
dramatically.  
The energy transition challenge encompasses not only shifts in the energy mix but also an array of 
institutional reforms, involving new relationship between public and private actors, as well as 
broadened governance including local actors. Jordan and Lebanon differ strongly from the point of 
view of institutional reforms and the local governance of energy. Jordan appears as the good pupil in 
the class of reforming countries. Its electricity sector, which had never been fully public and was 
overtime characterized by an alliance of private and State (Tomeira 2008), has been largely privatized 
since the beginning of the new millennium. The former State utility has been split into subsidiaries, 
and the majority of the State’s shares have been sold to private investors. The regulation of the 
sector has also been change, the Minister of Energy officially leaving that mission to an independent 
authority. But behind those shifts, we have shown that the State has retained some levers of control, 
be it through special relationship with the private investors of through not allowing full 
independency to the independent regulation authority23
One of the interesting things with such a point is that we can somehow correlate it to the local 
governance of energy, ie with the way local authorities and other local actors (sometimes informal) 
are involved in the management of the energy transition. In Jordan, the reaffirmed alliance of the 
State and the private sector is obtained at the expenses of the local authorities. Though the State 
holds discourses of strengthening of local authorities with decentralization policies, the 
municipalities of Jordan have small powers and little capacities to act as policy makers. This is 
particularly evidenced in the field of electricity, which do not belong to their legal field of 
competence. But they used to have, at least in the Irbid and in the Amman regions, special 
relationships with the electricity utilities. These relationships are now changed and the municipalities 
. In Lebanon, conversely, the discourse of 
privatization has not been translated in fact due to an array of impediments which do not appear to 
be changed soon.  
                                                          
23 We have not dealt with that issue in the paper but several interviewees have stressed that point. 
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seem to be marginalized through the privatization process. It is possible that the pressure due to the 
rising electricity bills will push them to devise new energy strategies. But despites the interests of 
international lenders in helping energy saving policies, they are targeting the municipalities and 
prefer to deal with the electricity utilities. 
Though the situation of the electricity sector in Lebanon has officially remained much more 
integrated at the national level, there are many evidences of strongly differentiated local governance 
patterns. The legacy of the civil war and of a sectarian society where groups have established specific 
relationships with the State on a regional and sectarian basis explains such a situation. The shortage 
of electricity and, hence, the issue of emerging alternatives to the public supply of electricity are 
other contexts favoring the emergence of such local governances pattern of the energy.  
The academic literature on energy transition in the Middle East and, probably, in other low income 
countries barely includes the issue of local governance and concentrates on national issues. In this 
paper, we have shown that local governance is an interesting entry point, even if we show at last that 
the local actors are not key actors in the policy making process and if we have to understand energy 
transition not only as a normative move towards renewable energy and ecologically friendly 
practices but as a much more complex situation of struggle for energy. The first explorations of the 
Lebanese and the Jordanian situations also show that the relevant actors of the energy local 
governance are not only institutions. Local movements and forces, like in the Lebanese case, are to 
be taken into consideration as well. These first results need further elaboration and are waiting for 
discussion. 
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Annex 
Table 1: Total primary energy supply (2006, source : IEA) 
 Total primary 
energy (ktoe) 
Oil Gas Hydroelectricity Geothermal, 
other 
renewable 
Jordan 7168 70,5% 28,1% 0,1% 1,3% 
Lebanon 4758 93,0% - 1,3% 5,6% 
Table 2: Electricity generation and consumption breakdown (2006, source : IEA) 
 Generation 2006 Consumption 2006 
 Oil Gas Hydro& 
Renewable 
Imports Total  
 
Per 
capita  
Jordan 3371 8135 51 472 10.54 1904 
Lebanon 8592  685 929 8.68 2148 
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